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SARS-CoV
Sampling from 
3 Portals
To the Editor: Wang et al. detect-
ed severe acute respiratory syn-
drome–associated coronavirus (SARS-
CoV) from throat wash and saliva
specimens and suggested that these
specimens have advantages over
other specimens, including ease of
procurement and safety for medical
personnel (1). The virus has been
detected with variable success from
nasopharyngeal aspirates, nose and
throat swabs, and tears (2,3).
Advocates of all of these sampling
methods emphasize the need for early
diagnosis of SARS. The probability
for nosocomial transmission to
healthcare workers when they obtain
specimens from patients has not been
adequately addressed. In a study of
outbreak control for SARS, Chowell
et al. suggest “… the strong sensitiv-
ity of R0 to the transmission rate
β  indicates that efforts in finding
intervention strategies that manage to
systematically lower the contact rate
of persons of all age groups promise
an effective means for lowering R0”
(4).
An important component of a
comprehensive strategy to lower the
contact rate is improving the safety
measures recommended for clinical
specimen collection by healthcare
workers. Recognizing the importance
of obtaining multiple specimens and
the difficulties associated with obtain-
ing samples from the 3 usual portals
of entry, we devised and tested a
novel method of specimen collection,
conjunctiva–upper respiratory tract
irrigation (5). We coupled our speci-
men collection method with detailed
written instructions to enable the
patients themselves to perform the
entire procedures. Almost all other
specimen collection methods require
assistance from healthcare workers or
have other limitations, such as inabil-
ity to sample all 3 portals. The method
is not perfect because some persons
have difficulty performing the proce-
dure; however, self-instillation of the
irrigation into the nostrils, with or
without the addition of a throat wash
or saliva, is likely to improve the suc-
cess rate. The data supplied by Loon
et al. (3) and Wang et al. (1) confirm
that collecting specimens by a method
that involves minimal contact
between a possible source of infection
and susceptible persons is desirable.
The author has shares of a company
that owns a patent-pending conjunctiva-
upper respiratory tract irrigation system.
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Occupational
Health Response 
to SARS 
To the Editor: Severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS), an occupa-
tional disease risk for healthcare
workers, warrants an occupational
health response, as clearly described
by Esswein et al. (1). Occupational
health  professionals played a role in
the assessment of healthcare facilities
in Taiwan and many other countries.
For example, occupational health pro-
fessionals were invited to perform
audits in at least 2 hospitals in
Singapore during the height of the cri-
sis, (2) and to conduct follow-up dis-
cussions with the hospital manage-
ment. In addition to assessment of the
industrial hygiene aspects, which
included evaluating the ventilation
modifications needed for effective
infection control, temperature and
humidity were significant factors
affecting the use of protective gear in
a tropical country like Singapore. The
occupational health audits included
site inspections and reviews of work
processes of those areas where actual
transmission of SARS had occurred
and where triage of febrile patients
was taking place. Other issues identi-
fied as requiring urgent attention were
providing sufficient rest, shower, and
changing facilities for staff, monitor-
ing staff sickness absenteeism, and
proactively managing staff mental
health. Occupational health physi-
cians subsequently served on hospital
SARS debriefing committees that
reviewed institutional shortcomings
and recommended new measures for
future outbreaks. An occupational
health service unit headed by a trained
occupational health physician was
formed in 1 hospital.
Other occupational groups, as well
as healthcare workers, are also at
potential risk. These groups may
include the following: 1) food han-
dlers, defined as persons who handle,
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kill, or sell food animals, and persons
who prepare and serve food. (More
than one third of the cases in China
with onset of SARS before February
1, 2003, were in food handlers [3].);
2) public transportation workers and
airline crew (4); and 3) laboratory
workers handling samples or items
contaminated with SARS-associated
coronavirus (5). In Singapore, 2 taxi
drivers were infected after ferrying
SARS patients to healthcare facilities,
and 1 Singapore Airlines cabin atten-
dant came down with the infection
after a flight with infected passengers
on board. Occupationally acquired
SARS infections have been docu-
mented in Singapore, Taiwan, and
Beijing. Clearly, occupational health
responses are needed in these occupa-
tional settings.
The recognition of SARS as an
occupational disease has broader
implications. Depending on country
legislation, persons who contract
SARS while performing their work
may be eligible for worker’s compen-
sation. Employers would be obligated
to provide a safe and healthy work-
place for their employees.
David Koh,* Meng-Kin Lim,*
Choon-Nam Ong,* 
and Sin-Eng Chia*
*National University of Singapore,
Singapore
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Tracing SARS-
Coronavirus
Variant with Large
Genomic Deletion 
To the Editor: Severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) has been a
global public health issue (1). We
completed a study on the evolutionary
path of the SARS-associated coron-
avirus (SARS-CoV) during the
2002–2003 epidemic (2). Most human
SARS-CoV strains, as exemplified by
the Tor2 sequence (GenBank acces-
sion no. AY274119) (3), are character-
ized by the deletion of a 29-nucleotide
(nt) segment upstream of the nucleo-
capsid (N) gene domain when com-
pared with the viral strains isolated
from the earliest human SARS
patients (2) or from nonhuman mam-
malian hosts (4). Towards the end of
the epidemic, a variant of the SARS-
CoV with a deletion of 386 nt flank-
ing the 29-nt site was first demonstrat-
ed by complete genomic sequencing
in 2 patients in Hong Kong (GenBank
accession nos. AY394999, AY395000,
AY395001, AY395002) (2). The 386-
nt deleted segment corresponds to the
genomic region spanning residues
27719 to 28104 of the Tor2 sequence
(3). The deletion results in the disrup-
tion of a putative open reading frame,
orf 9, while eliminating orfs 10 and
11. This deletion variant was first
isolated from 2 SARS patients with
disease onset in mid-May 2003.
Patient A was a 41-year-old female
phlebotomist working in North
District Hospital, New Territories
East Cluster, Hong Kong. Patient B
was a 98-year-old woman admitted to
ward X of North District Hospital (2). 
With this finding late in the epi-
demic, we studied the prevalence of
this SARS-CoV variant to determine
its origin. Twenty-one SARS patients
with disease onset dates from mid-
April were identified. All cases had
been confirmed by positive reverse
transcription–polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) detection of SARS-
CoV RNA in clinical specimens or
seroconversion. These patients had
been admitted with SARS to 4 differ-
ent hospitals in Hong Kong, including
North District Hospital and hospitals
A and B, which were located in the
same geographic cluster as North
District Hospital, as well as hospital
C, which was geographically distant
from the other 3 hospitals. Clinical
specimens were retrieved, and RT-
PCR was performed to specifically
amplify a genomic segment of SARS-
CoV encompassing the deletion site.
Specimens with shortened PCR frag-
ments were sequenced to determine
the location and precise extent of the
deletion. 
RT-PCR products were not ob-
served in 2 specimens. Gel elec-
trophoresis of the RT-PCR products
for each of the remaining 19 speci-
mens showed a single genomic frag-
ment; 13 of these fragments were
shortened. Direct sequencing of the
short amplicons showed a deletion of
386 nt identical to that isolated from
patients A and B. The patients’ histo-
ries were reviewed. Patients A, B, and
the 13 patients appeared to be epi-
demiologically related. The epidemio-
logic relationships and clinical details
of the 15 cases are illustrated in the
Figure. Most of the cases were part
of a documented outbreak at North
District Hospital traceable to an
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